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Does competition only impact on insolvency risk? New evidence from the Chinese 
banking industry  
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose- This paper investigates the impact of competition on credit risk, liquidity risk, 
capital risk and insolvency risk in the Chinese banking industry during the period 2003-2013. 
Design/methodology/approach- This study uses a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
system estimator to examine the impact of competition on risk. In particular, translog 
specifications are used to measure the competition and insolvency risk.  
Findings- The results show that greater competition within each bank ownership type (state-
owned commercial banks, joint-stock commercial banks and city commercial banks) leads to 
higher credit risk, higher liquidity risk, higher capital risk, but lower insolvency risk. 
Originality- This paper is the first piece of research testing the impact of competition on 
different types of risk in banking industry and it further contributes to the empirical literature 
by using a more accurate competition indicator (efficiency-adjusted Lerner index) and a more 
precise insolvency risk indicator (stability inefficiency).  
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1. Introduction 
The Chinese banking sector has undergone sustainable and healthy development through several 
rounds of banking reforms initiated by the government since 1978. The main purpose of these 
banking reforms has been to increase competitive conditions, enhance stability and improve the 
performance of the Chinese banking sector. State-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) dominate the 
industry. However, according to statistics from the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), 
the share of SOCB assets in total banking sector assets decreased between 2003 and 2013 to a low 
point of 43.3%. On the other hand, the joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) and city commercial 
banks (CCBs) have kept increasing in size and in 2013 they held 17.8% and 10.03% of total banking 
sector assets. Table 1 summarizes the assets of SOCBs, JSCBs, CCBs and total banking 
institutions in China over the period 2003-2013. 
<<Table 1---about here>> 
The Chinese banking industry has reduced its credit risk undertaken over the period 2003-2013. Non-
performing loan ratios over the period 2011-2013 were kept at 1% which was lower than the figures 
for 2008-2010. The Chinese banking industry also reduced the capital risk. CBRC statistics show that, 
by the end of 2013, the average capital adequacy ratio of Chinese banks was 12.2% which increased 
by 1.6% compared to the previous year. In addition, the liquidity ratio of Chinese commercial banks 
was 44% by the end of 2013. The ratio was lower than the figure for 2012, which was 45.8%, but it 
was higher than the ones for 2010 and 2011 which were 42.2% and 43.2%, respectively.  
There are two different views with regard to the relationship between competition and risk. These are: 
competition-fragility and competition-stability. The former argues that banks have the ability to 
withstand shocks and decrease risk-taking behaviour due to the fact that higher profitability can be 
earned through monopoly rents in a less competitive market (Allen and Gale, 2004; Boyd and De 
Nicole, 2005). 
The competition-stability view suggests that in a less competitive banking market, banks charge 
higher interest rates, which will increase the probability of default on loan repayments. By allowing 
for imperfect correlation across individual firms’ default probabilities, Martinez-Miera and Repullo 
(2010) suggest that there is a U-shape relationship between competition and risk; therefore, as the 
number of banks increases, the probability of bank default first declines but then increases. Overall, 
the issue of whether or not competition precedes bank stability or fragility is unresolved. 
There are a few pieces of research investigating competitive conditions in the Chinese banking sector 
(see section 3). Our study contributes to the empirical literature on Chinese banking competition by 
testing the impact of competition on the risk-taking behaviour of Chinese banks. Furthermore, we fill 
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gaps in the banking literature by examining the effect of competition on bank stability in the 
following two ways: 1) rather than focusing only on insolvency risk (Liu et al., 2013; Liu and Wilson; 
2013), our study investigates credit risk, liquidity risk, and capital risk; 2) we use an efficiency-
adjusted Lerner index because it provides more robust results (Tabak et al., 2012) compared to the 
Lerner index used by most of the empirical studies; 3) rather than using Z-score as the indicator of 
insolvency risk (Liu et al., 2012, Liu et al., 2013; Liu and Wilson, 2013), the current study uses 
stability inefficiency as the indicator which provides more robust results. The investigation of this 
topic is particularly important in the Chinese banking industry due to the fact that as a result of this 
analysis, the Chinese government and banking regulatory authority can make more comprehensive 
policies not only on the whole banking industry, but also more importantly, relevant policies can be 
made specifically on different ownership types of Chinese commercial banks. This study not 
marginally but significantly contributes to the empirical research of the relationship between 
competition and risk by firstly testing the impact of competition on different types of risk-taking 
behavior.  
The empirical results show that CCBs have the highest credit risk, followed by SOCBs, while JSCBs 
have the lowest credit risk. In addition, SOCBs are found to have the highest liquidity risk. Finally, 
the results indicate that the insolvency risk of SOCBs is the highest compared to the other bank 
ownership types. Our findings suggest that greater competition within each bank ownership type leads 
to higher credit risk, higher liquidity risk, higher capital risk but lower insolvency risk.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the structure and reforms of the 
Chinese banking industry; section 3 reviews the literature regarding the impact of competition on risk-
taking behaviour in the banking sector, as well as studies examining the competitive conditions in the 
Chinese banking industry; section 4 presents the methodologies and data used in the study; section 5 
discusses the empirical results, which is followed by section 6 discussing the robustness check, while 
section 7 concludes the paper.  
2. The Chinese banking industry 
The Chinese banking system followed a mono-bank model before 1978. The Peoples’ Bank of China 
(PBC) took the function of a central bank, as well as engaging in commercial bank operations. A 
series of economic reforms was initiated by the Chinese government in 1979 to transform the planned 
economy to a market-based economy. The banking sector in China was also rebuilt and redesigned. A 
two-tier banking system was created during the period 1979-1993, with the PBC free to serve as the 
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Central Bank and four SOCBs1 to engage in commercial bank lending. A number of JSCBs2 and rural 
and urban credit cooperatives were also established during this period. The SOCBs made loans to 
state-owned enterprises under government direction with no consideration of credit checks and risk 
monitoring which lead to the accumulation of non-performing loans. During this period, competition 
among Chinese banks was limited.  
In order to alleviate the problem of large volumes of non-performing loans in SOCBs, three policy 
banks were established by the Chinese government in 1994. Their main functions were: 1) to take 
over the responsibilities undertaken by SOCBs previously and 2) to make loans in line with 
government policies. Thus, SOCBs were transformed gradually into true commercial banks and they 
had increasing freedom in terms of credit and lending decisions.  
In order to reduce the volumes of non-performing loans in SOCBs, four asset management companies 
(AMCs) (Cinda AMC, Huarong AMC, Great Wall AMC and Oriental AMC) were established by the 
government in 1999, with each oriented to a specific state-owned bank. The AMCs purchased and 
managed non-performing loans and they were under the supervision of the PBC. There have been 
three non-performing loan write-offs by AMCs - in 1999, 2004 and 2005. In 1999, the four AMCs 
purchased RMB 1.4 trillion non-performing loans from the four SOCBs and China Development 
Bank. In 2004, non-performing loans worth RMB 278.7 billion were purchased by Cinda AMC from 
the Bank of China and the China Construction Bank. In 2005, non-performing loans worth RMB 
142.4 billion were purchased by Oriental and Cinda AMC from the Bank of China, RMB 56.9 billion 
from the China Construction Bank and RMB 64 billion from the Bank of Communication. These 
purchases reduced the volumes of non-performing loans of Chinese SOCBs and increased their 
competitiveness in the world. 
The Chinese government and banking regulatory authorities deal not only with the issue of non-
performing loans, but take measures to increase competition in the banking sector, such as easing the 
licensing and entry requirements for new small and medium-sized domestic banks. A number of new 
JSCBs were established in 1996, 2004 and 20053. Furthermore, in order for the banks to obtain 
external funds and in an attempt to increase competition among them, all the Chinese banks were 
encouraged to list on the stock exchange. By the end of 2013, all the SOCBs had offered successfully 
their initial public offerings (IPOs), with ICBC having raised US$21.9 billion on the Shanghai and 
                                                            
1They were the Bank of China (BOC), Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), China Construction Bank 
(CCB) and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). 
2 These banks include Citic Bank, China Merchant Bank, Shenzhen Development Bank, China 
Everbright Bank, Industrial Bank, Guangdong Development Bank, HuaXia Bank Shanghai Pudong 
Development Bank and Evergrowing Bank. 
3They are: China Minsheng Bank, China Zheshang Bank and China Bohai Bank.  
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Hong Kong stock exchanges in 2006, becoming the largest IPO at that time. The successful listing of 
the Agricultural Bank of China on the Shanghai and Hong Kong Stock Exchanges in 2010 broke the 
record made by ICBC, and raised funds worth USD 22.1 billion, becoming the second largest IPO in 
the world until now, while eight of the 12 JSCBs have been listed on a variety of stock exchanges4. 
The CBRC, which is the primary government agency and point of control for commercial banks, was 
established by the State Council 5  in 2003. The CBRC is responsible not only for supervising 
commercial banking operations, but also for formulating rules and regulations, authorizing the 
establishment, changes, termination and business scope of banking institutions and conducting on-site 
examination and off-site surveillance of their operations. The objective is to protect the interests of 
depositors and maintain market confidence through prudent and effective supervision.  
At the end of 2013, the Chinese banking sector consisted of three policy banks, five large-scale (state-
owned) commercial banks6, 12 JSCBs, 145 CCBs and a large number of other financial institutions, 
such as credit cooperatives, foreign banks, trust companies and the finance companies of enterprise 
groups.  
3. Literature review 
There are few papers investigating the impact of competition on risk-taking behaviour in the banking 
sector. Using the Lerner index as the competition indicator, the ratio of non-performing loans over 
total loans and a Z-score as the indicators of credit risk and probability of default, Agoraki et al. (2011) 
investigate the impact of competition on risk in the central and eastern European banking sector over 
the period 1985-2005. The empirical findings suggest that banks with market power (due to lower 
competition) tend to take on lower credit risk and have a lower probability of default. 14 Asia Pacific 
economies are studied by Fu et al. (2014) from 2003 to 2010. The probability of bankruptcy and a 
bank’s Z-score are used as risk indicators. The empirical results suggest that greater concentration 
fosters financial fragility, lowers pricing power and induces risk-taking. The impact of competition on 
risk-taking behaviour for a large sample of banks from different countries around the world during the 
period 1994 to 2009 is investigated by Beck et al. (2013). The empirical findings suggest that there is 
a significant impact of competition on banks’ fragility in countries with stricter activity restrictions, 
lower systemic fragility, better developed stock exchanges, more generous deposit insurance and a 
more effective system of credit information sharing. Using a sample of European banks over the 
                                                            
4 They are: China Merchant Bank, China Citic Bank, Hua Xia Bank, China Everbright Bank, 
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, China Minsheng Bank, Industrial Bank and Ping An bank 
(Shenzhen Development bank). 
5
 The State Council is the chief administrative authority of the People’s Republic of China.  
6 They are: Bank of China (BOC), China Construction Bank (CCB), Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China (ICBC), Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) and Bank of Communication (BOCOM). 
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period 1995 to 2005, Schaeck and Cihak (2014) investigate the effect of bank competition on bank 
stability; the Z-score is used as the stability indicator, while the boone indicator is used to measure 
bank competition. The findings suggest that competition enhances bank stability but that the impact is 
stronger for healthy banks rather than ones with greater fragility. Using a large sample of banks across 
63 countries over the period 1997-2009, Anginer et al. (2014) investigate the impact of competition 
on the systemic risk undertaken by banks. Their findings show that more diversified risks are 
undertaken by banks in an environment of greater competition.  
Liu et al. (2013) investigate the effect of competition on bank stability using a sample of banks across 
11 European countries over the period 2000-2008. The empirical findings suggest that there is an 
inverted U-shape relationship between regional bank competition and stability. Liu et al. (2012) use a 
sample of commercial banks across four Asia countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and 
Vietnam) over the period 1998-2008 to investigate the impact of competition on the banks’ risk-
taking behaviour. Four risk indicators are used - loan loss reserve, loan loss provision, volatility of 
ROA and Z-score - while the Panzar-Rosse H statistic is used to measure bank competition. Their 
findings show that competition does not increase bank risk-taking behaviour.  
Liu and Wilson (2013) investigate the impact of competition on risk-taking behaviour for different 
types of Japanese banks over the period 2002-2009. The Lerner index and a Z-score are used as 
competition and risk indicators, respectively. The empirical findings suggest that the effect of 
competition on bank risk varies across different types of Japanese banks, based on different initial 
levels of risk. To be more specific, their results show that the risk of City banks with higher initial 
levels of risk is reduced by increasing competition, while increasing competition leads to an increase 
in other bank ownership types with lower initial levels of risk.  
Using a broad set of commercial banks over the period 1994-2009, Soedarmono et al. (2013) 
investigate the impact of bank competition on financial stability in emerging markets. The Lerner 
index is used to measure bank competition and various risk indicators are controlled (mainly focusing 
on capital risk and insolvency risk) which include total risk-based capital ratio; ratio of total equity to 
total assets; standard deviation of ROA; standard deviation of ROE; Z-score based on ROA as well as 
Z-score based on ROE. The empirical results indicate that a higher degree of market power (lower 
competition) leads to higher insolvency risk for banks and banks hold lower levels of capital in a more 
competitive banking environment.  
There is a small number of studies examining competitive conditions in the Chinese banking industry. 
Yuan (2006) analyses the competitive conditions in the Chinese banking industry over the period 
1996-2000. The results suggest that China’s banking sector is already near to a state of perfect 
competition (that is before foreign banks began to enter China’s financial markets). The competitive 
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conditions facing 16 Chinese banks during the period 2004-2007 are evaluated by Masood and Sergi 
(2011). The results show that the Chinese banking sector is monopolistically competitive over the 
period examined. Fu (2009) examines the competitive conditions for a panel of 76 Chinese banks over 
the period 1997-2007. The results indicate also that there is monopolistic competition in the Chinese 
banking sector. She suggests that, after China’s accession to the WTO, competition in the core market 
for bank lending increases, while the off-balance-sheet market seems to become less competitive. 
Market concentration and competition in the Chinese banking industry over the period 1992-2008 is 
examined by Park (2013). The study indicates that the Chinese banking industry is still highly 
concentrated and that its level of competition is closer to oligopoly. Using the Lerner index as the 
competition indicator, Tan and Floros (2013) investigate the competitive conditions of Chinese 
SOCBs, JSCBs and CCBs over the period 2003-2011. The empirical findings suggest that competition 
among CCBs is the lowest over the examined period, followed by SOCBs, while competition among 
JSCBs is the highest. Tan (2014) uses both the Panzar-Rosse H statistic and the Lerner index to 
investigate the competitive conditions in the Chinese banking sector over the period 2003-2011. The 
empirical results suggest that the industry operates under monopolistic competition, while competition 
among CCBs is the lowest and competition among JSCBs is the highest. He further examines the 
impact of competition on risk-taking behaviour (credit risk and insolvency risk). The findings show 
that in a more competitive environment, Chinese commercial banks tend to undertake higher credit 
risk.  
A number of studies have investigated the issue of competition on risk-taking behavior and more 
specifically, there are few studies investigating this issue in the Chinese banking industry. Most of the 
studies use the Lerner index as the competition indicator although there are few cases in which either 
the Boone indicator or Panzar-Rosse H statistics are used. The current study contributes to the 
empirical research by testing the competitive conditions in the Chinese banking industry using an 
efficiency-adjusted Lerner index. In addition, most of the empirical studies to date have focused on 
credit risk measured by non-performing loans, as well as insolvency risk measured by Z-score or 
volatility of bank return, although there was one case considering capital risk as well. The current 
study contributes significantly to the empirical studies by comprehensively examining different types 
of risk-taking behavior, in particular, the current study uses stability inefficiency as the indicator of 
insolvency risk. This fills a gap in the empirical literature with regard to the impact of competition on 
risk in banking.  
4. Methodology 
4.1. Efficiency-adjusted Lerner index 
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Previous studies have used different methods to investigate the competitive conditions in the banking 
industry (Al-Muharrami et al., 2006; Matthews et al., 2007; Jeon et al., 2011; Olivero et al., 2011; 
Tabak et al., 2012; Cipollini and Fiordelisi, 2012; Fungacova et al., 2014; Fu et al., 2014). The 
measurement of competition in the above mentioned studies mainly includes Panzar-Rosse H 
statistics, the Boone indicator and the Lerner index.  
Although there are a number of studies which have used the Panzar-Rosse H statistic to investigate 
competition in the banking sector, it suffers from two main drawbacks. First, the H statistic was 
developed on the basis of a static model and there are no predictions of the H-statistic (Leuvensteijn et 
al., 2011). In other words, the estimate is surrounded by a degree of uncertainty. Secondly, the overall 
market equilibrium required by the test cannot be fulfilled because of market entry and exit, which 
leads to further limits on the interpretation of such an analysis (Claessens and Laeven, 2004).  
The Boone indicator also s ffers from two disadvantages. First, it makes the assumption that part of 
the efficiency gains achieved by banks are passed on to consumers. In addition, this indicator also 
suffers from idiosyncratic variation, i.e. uncertainty (see Tabak et al., 2012). 
The Lerner index is defined as the difference between a bank's price and its marginal cost, divided by 
the price. The index value ranges from a maximum of 1 to a minimum of zero, with higher numbers 
indicating greater market power and hence lower competition. The Lerner index represents the extent 
to which a particular bank has market power to set its price above the marginal cost. 
There are also arguments pointing up the disadvantage of the Lerner index. Fernandez de Guevara et 
al. (2005) argue that there are several problems when estimating the Lerner index. First, the value of 
the Lerner index changes according to different revenues used in their study. It is frequently the case 
that only interest and costs are considered while other non-interest revenues and expenses are omitted. 
Considering traditional loan-deposit services as revenue ignores the banking activities of providing 
other services that have grown substantially during recent years. This will lead to an inaccurate result 
when it comes to calculating competitive conditions in the banking sector. Secondly, the cost of risk, 
which is very important in the profit and loss account of banks, is generally not considered at all. 
Ignoring the cost of risk can be attributed to issues like insufficient data and calculation difficulties. If 
the cost of risk is not included when estimating the cost function, the Lerner index will be interpreted 
inaccurately because margins are overestimated. Thirdly, Bikker et al. (2007) argue that another 
weakness of the Lerner index is that the prices and costs required to calculate the index are not clearly 
identified by available bank balance sheet data, which leads to prices and costs being proxied for by 
many debatable factors.  
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We follow Clerides et al. (2015) with regard to the estimation of the efficiency-adjusted Lerner index, 
which can be expressed as follows: 
 
itit
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qmctc
rnerindexadjustedLeefficiency
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−+
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π
π *
    (1) 
Where i and t represent specific bank operating at a specific year, π represents bank profit which is 
measured by net income, tc represents total cost which is calculated by the sum of interest expenses 
as well as non-interest interests, q stands for earning assets. We use total loans and total securities as 
the measurement of earning assets. mc stands from marginal cost. The calculation can be explained as 
follows: 
 
The marginal cost is estimated on the basis of a translog cost function with four outputs (total loans, 
total deposits, total securities and non-interest income) and two input prices (price of funds, price of 
capital). The specification of the translog cost function is shown as below (Tabak et al., 2012):               
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2) 
where C represents total cost of the bank, Y represents four outputs including Y1 (total deposits), Y2 
(total loans), Y3 (non-interest income) and Y4 (total securities), W stands for two input prices with 
W1 representing the price of funds which is measured by the ratio of interest expenses to total funding, 
W2 represents the price of capital, which is measured by the ratio of non-interest expenses to fixed 
assets, two input prices are considered due to the fact that non-interest expenses include the labour 
cost as well (Hasan and Morton, 2003). In other words, the price of capital considers the factors 
relating to the price of physical capital as well as the price of human capital. We also consider the 
technical innovations that happened in the banking sector over the examined period by including the 
time trend variable tT . Two year dummy variables representing year 2004 and 2005 are included as 
well in the cost function due to the fact that Chinese government took a number of measures to deal 
with the non-performing loan issues of Chinese commercial banks, such as non-performing loans 
write-up and capital injection, it is supposed that it has a significant impact on the cost function.  Due 
to the fact that we distinguish three different ownership types of Chinese commercial banks (state-
owned commercial banks, joint-stock commercial banks and city commercial banks) and, we add two 
dummies DJ and DC for JSCBs, joint-stock commercial banks, and CCBs, city commercial banks.  
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The linear homogeneity is ensured by normalizing the dependent variable and W1 by anther input 
price W2.  Table 2 provides the definition of the variables used to measure the efficiency-adjusted 
Lerner index while the summary statistics of the variables are reported in Table 3. 
<<Table 2---about here>> 
<<Table 3---about here>> 
The marginal cost of loans can be obtained by taking the first derivative of the dependent variable in 
the above equation in relationship to the output loans as follows: 
∑
≠−
= +++=
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4.2. Estimation of insolvency risk in the Chinese banking sector - stability inefficiency 
The Z-score7  has been used widely to measure the stability of financial institutions in empirical 
research (Iannotta et al. 2007; William and Prather, 2010; Liu and Wilson 2013; Liu et al. 2013; 
among others). Tabak et al. (2012) argue that the potential stability of banks is not necessarily 
reflected by the Z-score. The deviation from the bank’s current stability and its maximum stability 
must be considered. We provide a measure of the bank’s stability inefficiency by estimating a 
stochastic frontier (Aigner et al., 1977; Meeusen and Van den Broeck, 1977) with the Z-score as the 
dependent variable of the translog specification. The degree of stability inefficiency is measured how 
far a bank is off the maximum Z-score, i.e. the stochastic frontier. The equation we use to estimate the 
frontier can be expressed as follows. The explanatory part of the right hand side of below equation 
describes the maximal Z-score (so the least inefficiency/probability of default). A bank is highly 
inefficient/highly likely to default, if it has a very low Z-score, or (“maximal Z-score” – “Z-score of 
bank i”) is large. A bank type is on average highly inefficient, if the mean of υ, µ, for that bank type is 
large.  
                                                            
7 The Z-score reflects the extent to which banks have the ability to absorb losses. Thus, a higher value 
of the Z-score indicates lower risk and greater stability. The calculation of the Z-score can be 
expressed as follows: 
)(
/
ROA
AEROA
Z
σ
+
=
 
where ROA is banks’ Return on Assets, E/A is the ratio of equity over total assets, 
)(ROAσ is the standard deviation of Return on Assets.  
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W represents input price: we consider two input prices which are the price of funds (the ratio of 
interest expenses over total funding) and the price of capital (the ratio of non-interest expenses over 
fixed assets). We follow Tabak et al. (2012) by employing a negative performance indicator (NPI) to 
address the issue of negative values of Z-score. This indicator will take the value of 1 when Z-score is 
equal or more than 0, while this indicator will be 0 if Z-score is less than 0. The dependent variable 
will take the value of 1 when it is negative. We did not include the macroeconomic variables in the 
above specification due to the fact that the estimation focuses on a single country rather than cross-
countries. In order to be consistent compared to equation 2, we include time trend variable, two year 
dummy variables, as well as two ownership dummy variables representing two different bank 
ownership types, namely joint-stock commercial banks (DJ) and city commercial banks (DC) in the 
specification. The sub-indices i and t represent bank i operating at time t, while j and k represent 
different outputs. The error term itε  equals itit υν − . The first term itν  captures the random 
disturbance which is assumed to be normally distributed and represents measurement errors and other 
uncontrolled factors, i.e. 
itν ~N(0, 
2
νσ ). The second term itυ  captures technical and allocative 
inefficiency, both under managerial control, and we assume it to be half-normally distributed, i. e. 
itυ ~
+N ( ,itµ
2
υσ ). The inefficiency is calculated using a stochastic frontier model for panel data 
provided by the statistical software Stata through assuming that the inefficiency term is half-normally 
distributed
8
.  
4.3. Investigation of the impact of competition on the risk-taking behaviour of Chinese banks 
In order to test the impact of competition on the risk-taking behaviour of the Chinese banking sector, 
the following equation is used: 
ititititittiit DCDJMacroicbankspecifncompetitioncompetitio νµββββββλαβα +++++++++= − 6543
2
211,0
                                                                                                                                                (5) 
In equation (5), itα  is the risk measure for bank i (i=1 ...N) at time t (t=1 ...T). Risk is measured by 
different variables including credit risk, liquidity risk, capital risk, and insolvency risk. Credit risk is 
measured by the ratio of impaired loans over gross loans, liquidity risk is measured by the ratio of 
total assets over liquid assets, capital risk is measured by the ratio of 1 over total regulatory capital 
ratio, while insolvency risk is measured by the stability inefficiency (Tabak et al., 2012) as discussed 
                                                            
8
 The estimation results of equation 4 can be requested from the corresponding author upon request. 
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earlier. A higher ratio of impaired loans over gross loans indicates that a bank has a higher credit risk; 
a higher figure of total assets over liquid assets shows that a bank has higher liquidity risk. In the case 
of the measurement of capital risk, a higher figure indicates higher capital risk. As discussed in the 
previous section, higher stability inefficiency underlines that there is a higher insolvency risk. 1, −tiα  is 
a one period lagged risk measure. nCompetitio  is the measurement of bank competition in the 
Chinese banking sector. In the current study, it is measured by the efficiency-adjusted Lerner index.  
The quadratic term of the efficiency-adjusted Lerner index is also included to address the non-linear 
relationship between competition and risk, as suggested by Martinez-Miera and Repullo 
(2010). ficBanksspeci includes a number of bank-specific variables which have been found to have 
influence on bank risk, including bank size, diversification and overhead expenses. Bank size is 
measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, bank diversification is measured by the ratio of non-
interest income over gross revenue, and overhead expenses are measured by the ratio of total 
overhead expenses to total assets. There is one macroeconomic variable included in the regression 
which is the annual inflation rate9. Finally, we distinguish between the three bank types. The intercept 
captures the effect of SOCBs while the coefficients in front of DJ and DC measure the difference of 
the effects of JSCBs and CCBs to SOCBs. In order to avoid possible endogeneity issues, the lagged 
values are used for all the independent variables in equation 5 to avoid possible endogeneity issues 
(except the dummy variables). 
 
Following Agoraki et al. (2011), we expect that competition has a significant and positive impact on 
the credit risk and insolvency risk of Chinese commercial banks. We have no a priori expectation with 
regard to the impact of competition on liquidity risk due to the fact that, higher competition may 
reduce the volume of traditional loan business as well as non-traditional activities, the increase in the 
availability of funds in the banks further leads to an improvement in bank liquidity and a reduction in 
liquidity risk. However, higher competition may induce bank managers to reduce risk checking and so, 
the lower credit requirement will increase the credit granted to different companies. In other words, a 
larger volume of loan business engaged in by the Chinese commercial banks may reduce the liquidity 
level and further proceed to an increase in liquidity risk.  Finally, following Soedarmono et al. (2013), 
we expect that in the Chinese banking industry, the impact of competition on capital risk is significant 
and negative.  
We do not have any a priori expectation with regard to the impact of bank size on bank risk. On the 
one hand, large banks have the ability to reduce costs via economies of scale and economies of scope, 
and the larger market power derived from cost reduction improves bank stability (Berger, 1995). On 
the other hand, managers in larger banks have the incentive to take on higher risk because they expect 
that higher risk normally comes with higher returns, while the government will bail out distressed 
banks because they are “too big to fail” (O’Hara and Shaw, 1990).  
                                                            
9 We previously followed Liu and Wilson (2013) and included GDP growth as well as a 
macroeconomic variable; however, it has automatically dropped out of the multicollinearity test. The 
test is not reported in this paper; however, it is available from the corresponding author upon request.  
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We expect that there will be a significant and positive relationship between diversification and bank 
risk. There are a number of studies which find that an increase in the volume of non-traditional 
activities increases risk in the US and European banking sectors (Stiroh, 2004; Mercieca et al., 2007; 
Laeven and Levine, 2007; Lepetit et al., 2008; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010).  
We expect that the impact of overhead expenses on bank risk will be significant and negative. 
Agoraki et al. (2011) argue that banks with larger amounts of overhead expenses tend to take on 
higher risk with the purpose of generating higher returns.  
We expect that the impact of inflation on bank risk is significant and negative. Lown and Morgan 
(2006) and Buch et al. (2014) argue that the financial system and the real economy are adversely 
affected by inflation. They suggest further that during a period of high inflation, decision making will 
be distorted, information asymmetry will be exacerbated and price will be volatile. In order to test 
whether the impacts of competition on various types of risk-taking behaviour in the Chinese banking 
industry are different across different bank ownership types, the interaction terms of the competition 
measure (lagged one year efficie cy-adjusted Lerner index)10  with bank ownership dummies are 
created. 
We use a two-step system GMM estimator to estimate equation 5 (Arellano and Bover, 1995; 
Blundell and Bond, 1998). Second and higher-order lags and differences in the dependent variables 
are used as an instrument to address the issue of endogeneity arising from the inclusion of the lagged 
dependent variable. The Hansen test of over-identifying restriction is reported and we also provided 
the probability values for the first and second order autocorrelation in the error term (Hansen, 1982). 
We use data for 100 Chinese commercial banks (5 SOCBs, 12 JSCBs and 83 CCBs) over the period 
2003-2013. Due to the fact that the banks in the sample, especially the CCBs, do not have available 
data for all the years, we opt for an unbalanced panel dataset in order not to lose degrees of freedom. 
The data on competition, risk and bank-specific variables are collected from the bankscope database, 
while the macroeconomic variable is collected from the World Bank database. Table 4 gives a 
summary of the variables used in the current study, their measurements and data sources. 
<<Table 4---about here>> 
Figure 1 shows the competitive conditions of the Chinese banking industry over the period examined. 
They are presented for all three different ownership types. It is observed that the minimum value of 
the efficiency-adjusted Lerner index is 0.3, while the highest value is nearly 0.62.  A comparison of 
these values with the values of the Lerner index from other countries shows that Chinese commercial 
                                                            
10 The quadratic term of the efficiency-adjusted Lerner index is excluded due to the fact that the linear 
relationship between competition and risk-taking behaviour is found in equation 5.  
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banks have substantially higher market power. To be more specific, a piece of research undertaken by 
Carbo et al. (2009) shows that the values of the Lerner index for the European Union banking sector 
range from 11%-22%, while for developed countries, the average value of the Lerner index for the 
banking sectors is 22% (Berger et al., 2009). Fungacova et al. (2010) show that the value of the 
Lerner index for the Russian banking sector is 21.4%. These comparisons show that competition in 
the Chinese banking industry is very low. The lower level of competition in the Chinese banking 
industry can be explained partly by the fact that we use a more advanced efficiency-adjusted Lerner 
index while the others mentioned use a traditional Lerner index.   
The efficiency-adjusted Lerner index suggests that between 2003 and 2013, city commercial banks 
have the highest market power compared to joint-stock commercial banks and state-owned 
commercial banks. In other words, the level of competition among city commercial banks is the 
lowest. The lower level of competition within CCBs can be explained as follows: 1) most of the 
SOCBs and JSCBs have listed already on the stock exchange, but most of the CCBs have not made 
their initial public offering yet, which lowers pressure to obtain funds from the general public and 
further reduces competition among them; 2) one of the characteristics of this banking ownership type 
is that most of the CCBs still operate within the city where they were established (although the 
geographical limitation for operation has already been removed for CCBs which had better 
performance). In other words, each CCB just serves the enterprises within their own city; this leads to 
a decline in bank competition. Finally, the figure shows state-owned commercial banks have higher 
market power than joint-stock commercial banks over the examined period.  
<<Figure 1---about here>> 
Figures 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d report the risk conditions of Chinese banks over the period 2003-2013, as 
measured by the the ratio of impaired loans to gross loans (credit risk); the ratio of total assets over 
liquid assets (liquidity risk); the ratio of 1 over total capital regulatory adequacy ratio (capital risk); 
and stability inefficiency (insolvency risk). Figure 2a shows that over the period 2003-2008, the credit 
risk of SOCBs is substantially higher than that of JSCBs and CCBs, while the large volume of non-
performing loans in SOCBs is attributed mainly to the fact that one of the banks - the Agricultural 
Bank of China - had non-performing loan ratios of over 23% during the period 2003-2007. Although 
the figure shows that after 2008, all the three different ownership types of Chinese commercial banks 
have few differences with regards to credit risk, the credit risk of CCBs is higher than that of JSCBs 
between 2005-2010. The low credit risk of JSCBs is attributed mainly to the fact that the participation 
of foreign investors in domestic JSCBs improves the techniques of risk management and further 
precedes a decline in credit risk. The significantly lower amount of credit risk for all three different 
ownership types of Chinese banks after 2008 is attributed to the financial crises which induced the 
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government and banking regulatory authorities to improve credit checking, risk monitoring and risk 
management.  
<<Figure 2a---about here>> 
liquidity risk, as represented in Figure 2b, shows that in general, the ratio of total assets over liquid 
assets for SOCBs is higher than that of JSCBs and CCBs. In other words, the SOCBs have the highest 
liquidity risk. This can be explained by the fact that SOCBs mainly make loans to large enterprises 
around the country; the loan demand for which is substantially higher than that for medium and small 
enterprises, which are served by JSCBs and CCBs. SOCBs also engage in a larger amount of business 
in derivatives and securities. The engagement of diversified activities further decreases liquidity. 
However, liquidity is the highest in CCBs over the period 2005-2008. This can be explained by the 
fact that they mainly have a simple business scope and have little engagement in non-traditional 
activities. Furthermore, the loans made by CCBs focus on small enterprises within cities, the amount 
of which is much smaller than for SOCBs. The JSCBs have the highest liquidity after 2010. We 
explain this improvement in liquidity by the fact that the annual meeting of directors of JSCBs was 
held in 2010 and subsequently the China Banking Regulatory Commission has emphasized the 
importance of further increases in the liquidity of JSCBs.  
<<Figure 2b---about here>> 
Compared to city commercial banks and state-owned commercial banks, joint-stock commercial 
banks have highest volatility in the levels of capital over the examined period. In general, the capital 
level of CCBs kept increasing for most of the years over the period examined, although CCBs showed 
a slight decrease in some of the years. This increase in capital levels is attributed to the contribution 
from city level government.  
<<Figure 2c---about here>> 
We look at the insolvency risk of the Chinese banking industry on a year by year basis, which is 
reflected by stability inefficiency (Figure 2d). The figure shows that the insolvency risk was more 
volatile during 2003-2006; while during 2007-2013, they reduced. The stronger volatility over the 
period 2003-2006 can be explained by the fact that there was a large amount of non-performing loans 
in Chinese commercial banks, especially SOCBs, and that the capital level of SOCBs was quite low. 
Furthermore, the Chinese government initiated a number of measures to deal with it, such as capital 
injection and non-performing loan write-off, while the financial crisis of 2007-2008 induced bank 
managers to be more careful in conducting business. The 2008 Olympic Games held in Beijing further 
promoted the economic growth of China. The resultant decline in the probability of default decreased 
the risk and increased the capital level of Chinese commercial banks.  
Page 15 of 39 International Journal of Managerial Finance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
International Journal of Managerial Finance
16 
 
 
<<Figure 2d---about here>> 
 
5. Results and discussion 
The summary statistics of the variables used in the study are provided in Table 5. They show that 
Chinese commercial banks have large differences with regard to credit risk and liquidity risk. The 
large difference in the credit risk undertaken by Chinese commercial banks indicates that Chinese 
commercial banks have different risk management capabilities and strategies, while the large 
difference in the credit risk undertaken is attributed to some extent to the large volume of non-
performing loans which existed in SOCBs between 2003 and 2005. The large difference in the 
liquidity position held by Chinese commercial banks lies in the fact that compared to joint-stock 
commercial banks and city commercial banks, state-owned commercial banks mainly focused on 
making loans to large enterprises with big projects, the resulted substantially larger volumes of loan 
demand from the state-owned commercial banks lead to a bigger difference with regard to the 
liquidity condition among Chinese commercial banks.  
Table 5 indicates further that Chinese commercial banks have greater market power, with an 
efficiency-adjusted Lerner index ranging from 0.3 to 0.62, while there is a bigger difference with 
regard to the size of Chinese commercial banks. SOCBs and JSCBs are larger than CCBs, as 
measured by total assets. There is quite a big difference with regards to the non-interest business 
engaged in by Chinese commercial banks. The statistics show that some Chinese commercial banks 
have negative non-interest income. This finding indicates that some Chinese commercial banks still 
lack experience and knowledge in relation to non-traditional ctivities, while in order to attract more 
customers, some Chinese commercial banks do not charge for services provided in relation to non-
traditional business, while higher operational costs lead to a loss on these transactions. However, it is 
found that there is not too big a difference among Chinese commercial banks in relation to overhead 
expenses. 
<<Table 5---about here>> 
      We test the stationarity of the residuals in the cost function using Levin-Lin and Chiu unit root test, 
the result of which is reported in Table 6. The results show that the residuals are stationary. Table 7 
presents the empirical results for equation 5. The explanatory powers of the models are reasonably 
high, while the Wald test statistics for all models are significant at the 1% level. The Hansen test 
shows that there is no evidence of over-identifying restrictions. Even though the equation indicates 
that first-order autocorrelation is present, this does not imply that the estimates are inconsistent. All 
the second-order autocorrelations are rejected which guarantees the consistency of the estimation. 
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      The results show that the one period lagged dependent variables are all significant which indicates that 
various types of risk-taking behaviour of Chinese commercial banks in the current year are affected 
significantly by the previous year. All the one period lagged dependent variables are significant and 
positive with regard to credit risk, liquidity risk, and capital risk, while the sign of the coefficient of 
stability inefficiency is significant and negative, suggesting that stability inefficiency is more volatile 
compared to the other types of risk-taking behaviour of Chinese commercial banks. The efficiency-
adjusted Lerner index is significant for all kinds of risk-taking behaviour, which indicates that there is 
a linear relationship between competition and the risk-taking behaviour of Chinese commercial banks. 
However, the square term of the efficiency-adjusted Lerner index is significant for credit risk and 
insolvency risk, which suggests that there is a U-shaped relationship between competition and these 
two types of risk-taking behaviour in the Chinese banking industry. In order to confirm whether the 
impact of competition on the risk-taking behaviour of Chinese banks is linear or not, we calculate the 
inflection points11. The results show that the inflection point for credit risk is above the maximum 
value of the efficiency-adjusted Lerner index, while the inflection point of stability inefficiency is 
below the minimum value of the efficiency-adjusted Lerner index. These findings confirm that there is 
a linear relationship between competition and risk-taking behaviour in the Chinese banking industry. 
Our results are in different contrast with Tabak et al. (2012) with regard to a sample of Latin 
American countries and Liu et al. (2013) in terms of a sample of European countries. Both of these 
two pieces of research reported that competition has non-linear impact on the banks’ risk-taking 
behaviour. The different finding between this study and the empirical research is mainly attributed to 
the following factors: 1) different banking sectors are examined with the current study examines the 
Chinese banking industry, while another two mentioned above examine the Latin American Industry 
as well as the European banking industry; 2) different indicators are used to measure the competition 
with the current study uses efficiency-adjusted Lerner index and another two mentioned above use the 
Boone indicator and the Lerner index.  
      The results suggest that Chinese commercial banks with more diversified activities have a higher 
volume of impaired loans, as reflected by the significant and positive sign of the coefficient. In other 
words, more diversified activities lead to higher credit risk. We explain this finding by the fact that 
banks engaging in a number of different interest and non-interest generating activities have less 
incentive to monitor the loan business, which leads to an increase in the volume of impaired loans and 
an increase in credit risk. Bank diversification is significantly and negatively related to the liquidity 
risk of Chinese commercial banks. This finding can be attributed to the fact that larger volumes of 
different activities engaged in by banks reduce their dependence on the loan business. The resulting 
                                                            
11 The inflection point is calculated by setting the first-order derivative to zero and comparing its 
value to the empirical distribution of the efficiency-adjusted Lerner index.  
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decrease in the volume of loans and increase in the volume of fee business services provided by banks 
increase liquidity. Chinese banks with more diversified activities have higher capital risk. The finding 
can be explained by the fact that Chinese commercial banks still lack the experience of skills in 
engaging in certain types of non-interest generating business and that capital is used to absorb the 
losses on these transactions. Finally, it is found that Chinese banks with higher levels of 
diversification have lower insolvency risk. Overhead expenses are significantly and positively related 
to the credit risk of Chinese commercial banks. This finding can be explained by the fact that Chinese 
commercial banks with higher volumes of overhead expenses do not have very well developed 
management systems. It indicates further that the banks do not manage and monitor risk very well, 
while poor monitoring and management processes precede an increase in credit risk. The results 
indicate also that Chinese banks with higher overhead expenses have lower liquidity risk and lower 
capital risk. For the banks with larger volumes of non-performing loans, it is expected that bank 
profitability will be affected negatively, while poorer performance induces customers to switch their 
deposits to other banks. The purpose of higher liquidity is to deal with sudden withdrawals, while a 
higher level of capital is necessary to absorb negative shocks.  
      We find that bank size is significantly and negatively related to the credit risk of Chinese commercial 
banks, which indicates that large commercial banks have lower credit risk. This can be explained by 
the fact that large Chinese commercial banks have a greater expertise in risk monitoring and 
management. It is also found that Chinese commercial banks with larger size have higher liquidity. 
The results show that larger Chinese commercial banks have lower capital risk, which indicates that 
they have higher levels of capital. Finally, the findings show that large Chinese banks have lower 
insolvency risk (higher stability), as reflected by their stability inefficiency.  
      We find that higher inflation leads to lower credit risk for Chinese commercial banks. This finding can 
be explained by the fact that in order to deal with higher inflation, the interest rate will be raised, the 
borrowing cost for different firms will be increased and the banks will grant loans to companies with 
better performance, which leads to a decline in credit risk. The results show also that capital risk for 
Chinese banks is lower during periods of high inflation. The results suggest that compared to the 
SOCBs, CCBs have higher credit risk and JSCBs have lower credit risk. This finding can be attributed 
to the fact that CCBs mainly make loans to small enterprises within cities; the capital levels of which 
are much lower than those of large and medium size enterprises. The adverse economic environment 
will affect the probability of loan repayment which precedes an increase in credit risk, while the lower 
credit risk of JSCBs can be attributed to foreign participation in the operations of the banks.  
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      JSCBs and CCBs have lower liquidity risk than SOCBs. This finding can be attributed to the fact the 
SOCBs mainly make loans to large sized enterprises in China. The demand for loans is much higher, 
and the higher volumes of loans provided by SOCBs reduce the liquidity levels of the banks.  
      The significant and negative signs of the coefficients of JSCBs and CCBs, when investigating stability 
inefficiency, indicate that compared to SOCBs, JSCBs and CCBs have lower insolvency risk. The 
higher stability inefficiency of SOCBs is attributed mainly to the fact that during 2003-2005 these 
banks had large volumes of non-performing loans as well as lower capital levels. 
Finally, we test the autocorrelation in the residuals using the Cumby-Huizinga test. The results of 
which are reported in Table 8. The results show that the first-order autocorrelation is present for all 
different types of risk and there is no second-order correlation, which is line with the results of the 
GMM estimation as reported in Table 7.    
                                                          <<Table 6---about here>> 
<<Table 7---about here>> 
<<Table 8---about here>> 
      Table 9 reports the empirical results regarding the impact of competition on risk-taking behaviour 
across different bank ownership types. The interaction terms of the efficiency-adjusted Lerner index 
and bank ownership are all significant and negative for credit risk, indicating that greater competition 
within each bank ownership type leads to higher credit risk. All the negative and significant 
coefficients of the interaction terms, with regards to liquidity risk, suggest that greater competition 
within different bank ownership types leads to higher liquidity risk. All the significant and positive 
coefficients of the interaction terms indicate that greater competition within each bank ownership 
leads to higher capital risk.  Finally, the results show that greater competition within each bank 
ownership type precedes a decline in insolvency risk. The positive impact of competition on credit risk 
can be explained by the fact that stronger competition induces bank managers to reduce the 
requirement of credit conditions with regard to allocating loans to different businesses, which leads to 
a larger volume of non-performing loans and higher credit risk. In terms of the impact of competition 
on liquidity risk, our finding can be explained by the fact that higher competition induces bank 
managers to engage in a greater number and variety of businesses in order to generate a higher volume 
of earnings, especially engaging in a larger volume of long-term business which significantly reduces 
bank liquidity and further precedes an increase in liquidity risk. The positive impact of competition on 
capital risk can be explained by the fact that certain amounts of capital will be used to engage n 
different businesses which reduces the capital level and further increases the capital risk. Finally, the 
negative impact of competition on insolvency risk is attributed to the fact that stronger competition 
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induces bank managers to engage in a variety of business rather than focusing on the traditional loan-
deposit services, the cost reduction derived from economies of scale together with the benefit from 
economies of scope increase the banks’ ability to meet their financial obligations, thus leading to a 
reduction in insolvency risk.  
      As indicated by the size of the coefficients, the results show that greater competition leads to the 
greatest increase in the risk-taking behaviour of CCBs with regards to credit risk, liquidity risk and 
capital risk, while an increase in competition will reduce the insolvency risk of SOCBs to the greatest 
extent.  
      <<Table 9---about here>> 
6. Robustness check 
We also ran three alternative tests to see whether our results are robust. First, we use different risk 
indicators to cross-check the robustness of the results. The ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans 
is used to measure credit risk. Liquidity risk is measured by the ratio of loans to total assets. The ratio 
of shareholders’ equity to total assets is used to measure capital risk. The Z-score is used as the 
indicator of insolvency risk. The results are quantitatively similar compared to the main results 
reported in this paper. Secondly, rather than use the GMM two-step system estimator, we double 
check the robustness of the results by employing a GMM two-step system estimator with 
Windmeijer’s correction for standard errors, which is supposed to provide more robust results. 
Furthermore, rather than using the dynamic model estimated by the GMM estimator, we run 
alternative regressions including and excluding the lagged dependent variable estimated by the 
ordinary least square (OLS) estimator and the fixed effort (FE) estimator. The results suggest that the 
coefficient on the lag of the dependent variable for the dynamic model is between those of the FE and 
OLS model, which show that our estimates are correct. Finally, we exclude the financial crisis period 
and re-run the regression; the results are still hold12. 
7. Summary and conclusions 
This paper investigates the impact of competition on the risk-taking behaviour of Chinese commercial 
banks over the period 2003-2013. Three different ownership types of Chinese commercial banks are 
considered: SOCBs, JSCBs and CCBs. Our findings suggest that CCBs have the highest credit risk 
compared to JSCBs and CCBs, while the liquidity risk of SOCBs is the highest. It is found that the 
insolvency risk of SOCBs is higher than that of JSCBs and CCBs. Greater competition within each 
bank ownership type leads to greater risk-taking behaviour by Chinese commercial banks (credit risk, 
                                                            
12
 The results with regard to the robustness check are not reported in the current paper, however, they are 
available from the corresponding author upon request. 
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liquidity risk, and capital risk). However, greater competition within each different type of bank 
ownership leads to lower insolvency risk. 
The Chinese government and banking regulatory authorities have attached greater importance to the 
risk-taking behaviour of Chinese commercial banks since the financial crisis which occurred in Asia 
in 2007-2008. However, this study is the first to investigate comprehensively the risk conditions in the 
Chinese banking industry. It is also the first piece of research to investigate the impact of competition 
on the risk-taking behaviour of Chinese commercial banks over the period 2003-2013. In a more 
general way, this research extends the empirical studies of Liu and Wilson (2013) and Liu et al. (2013) 
in relation to  the Japanese and European banking sectors in the following ways: 1) rather than 
focusing on insolvency risk, we examine comprehensively the risk conditions of Chinese commercial 
banks by including credit risk, liquidity risk and capital risk, as well as insolvency risk; 2) insolvency 
risk is measured by stability inefficiency rather than Z-score, which provides more robust results; 3) 
we check the robustness of the results by using different measurements of risk as well as different 
econometric techniques; 4) efficiency-adjusted Lerner index is used as the indicator of competition 
which provides more accurate results.   
The results provide policy implications for the Chinese government and its banking regulatory 
authority as follows: 1) Chinese city commercial banks should enhance further the risk monitoring 
and management process in order to reduce credit risk; 2) the Chinese government should reduce the 
degree of support to Chinese state-owned commercial banks; the lower level of government support 
will reduce the insolvency risk; 3) although greater competition makes Chinese commercial banks 
more solvent, it is recommended that competition should be controlled to a certain degree to reduce 
the credit risk, liquidity risk, and capital risk of Chinese commercial banks.  
The current paper suffers from a number of limitations. First, the measurement of risk variables can 
be improved. To be more specific, the accounting ratio is used to measure the liquidity risk in the 
current paper, while a future study can consider using the maturity of the assets and liabilities, and 
calculate the maturity gap. Secondly, the current study uses the efficiency-adjusted Lerner index to 
measure the competitive conditions. This can be improved in future studies by using the Boone 
indicator to measure the competitive conditions, which has the advantage of evaluating the 
competitive conditions in different banking markets such as loan markets, and deposit markets, as 
well as the non-interest income market.  
 
References 
Page 21 of 39 International Journal of Managerial Finance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
International Journal of Managerial Finance
22 
 
 
Agoraki, M. K., Delis, M. D. and Pasiouras, F. (2011), “Regulations, competition and bank risk-
taking in transition countries”, Journal of Financial Stability, Vol. 7 No. 1, pp. 38-48.  
Aigner, D., Lovell, C. A. and Schmidt, P. (1977), “Formulation and estimation of stochastic frontier 
production function models”, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 6 No. 1, pp. 21-37. 
Anginer, D., Demirguc-Kunt, A. and Zhu, M. (2014), “How does Bank competition affect systemic 
stability?”, Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 23 No. 1, pp. 1-26. 
Allen, F. and Gale, D. (2004), “Competition and financial stability”, Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking, Vol. 36 No. 3,  pp. 433-480. 
Al-Muharrami, S., Matthews, K. and Khabari, Y. (2006), “Market structure and competitive 
conditions in the Arab GCC banking system”, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 30 No. 12, pp. 
3487-3501. 
Arellano, M. and Bover, O. (1995), “Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-
components models”, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 68 No. 1, pp. 29-51. 
Beck, T., Jonghe, O. and Schepens, G. (2013), “Bank competition and stability: cross-country 
heterogeneity”, Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 22 No. 2, pp. 218-244. 
Berger, A. N. (1995), “The profit-structure relationship in banking-tests of market-power and 
efficient-structure hypotheses”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 27 No. 2, pp. 404-415. 
Berger, A. N., Klapper, L. and Turk-Ariss, R. (2009), “Bank competition and financial stability”, 
Journal of Financial Services Research, Vol. 35 No. 2, pp. 849-870. 
Bikker, J. A., Spierdijk, L., and Finnie, P. (2007). “The impact of market structure, contestability and 
institutional environment on bank competition”, DNB working paper No. 156, De Nederlandsche 
Bank, Amsterdam.  
Blundell, R. and Bond, S. (1998), “Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data 
models”, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 87 No. 1, pp. 115-143. 
 
Boyd, J. and DeNicolo, G. (2005), “The theory of bank risk-talking revisited”, Journal of Finance, 
Vol. 60 No. 3, pp. 1329-1343. 
 
Buch, C.M., Eickmeier, S. and Prieto, E. (2014), “Macroeconomic factors and Microlevel Bank 
Behavior”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 46 No. 4, pp. 715-751. 
 
Carbo, S., Humphrey, D., Maudos, J. and Molyneux, P. (2009), “Cross-country comparisons of 
competition and pricing power in European banking”, Journal of International Money and Finance, 
Vol. 28 No. 1, pp.115-134. 
Cipollini, A. and Fiordelisi, F. (2012), “Economic value, competition and financial distress in the 
European banking system”, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 36 No. 11, pp. 3101-3109. 
Claessens, S. and Laeven, L. (2004), “What drives Bank Competition? Some International Evidence”, 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 36 No. 3, pp. 563-584. 
Page 22 of 39International Journal of Managerial Finance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
International Journal of Managerial Finance
23 
 
 
Clerides, S., Delis, M.D. and Kokas, S. (2015), “A new Data Set on Competition in National 
Banking Markets”, Financial Markets, Institutions and Instrument, Vol. 24 No. 2-3,: pp. 267-
311.  
Demirguc-Kunt, A. and Huizinga, H. (2010), “Bank activity and funding strategies: the impact on risk 
and returns”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 98 No. 3, pp. 626-650. 
Fernandez de Guevara, J., Mandos, J. and Perez, F. (2005), “Market power in European banking”, 
Journal of Financial Services Research, Vol. 27 No. 2, pp. 109-137. 
Fu, M. (2009), “Competition in Chinese commercial banking”, Banking and Finance Review, Vol. 1 
No. 1, pp. 1-16. 
Fu, X., Liu, Y. and Molyneux, P. (2014), “Bank competition and financial stability in Asia Pacific”, 
Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol.  38, pp. 64-77. 
Fungacova, Z., Solanko, L. and Weill, L. (2010), “Market power in the Russian banking industry”, 
International Economics, Vol. 124, pp. 127-145.  
Fungacova, Z., Pessarossi, P. and Will, L. (2013), “Is bank competition detrimental to efficiency? 
Evidence from China”, China Economic Review, Vol. 27, pp. 121-134.  
Fungacova, Z., Solanko, L. and Weill, L. (2014), “Does competition influence the bank lending 
channel in the Euro area”, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 49, pp. 356-366. 
Hansen, L.P. (1982), “Large sample properties of generalized method of moments estimators”, 
Econometrica, Vol. 50 No. 4, pp. 1029-1054. 
Iannotta, G., Nocera, G. and Sironi, A. (2007), “Ownership structure, risk and performance in the 
European banking industry”, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 31 No. 7, pp. 2127-2149. 
Jeon, B. N., Olivero, M P. and Wu, J. (2011), “Do foreign bank increase competition? Evidence from 
emerging Asian and Latin American banking markets”, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 35 No. 
4, pp. 856-875. 
Laeven, L. and Levine, R. (2007), Is there a diversification discount in financial conglomerates? 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 85 No. 2, pp. 331-367. 
Lepetit, L., Nys, E., Rous, P. and Tarazi, A. (2008). Bank income structure and risk: an empirical 
analysis of European banks. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 32 No. 8, pp. 1452-1467. 
Leuvensteijn, M. V., Bikker, J. C., Rixtel, A.A.R.J.M.V. and Sorensen, C. K. (2011), “A new 
approach to measuring competition in the loan markets of the euro area”, Applied Economics, Vol. 43 
No. 23, pp. 3155-3167. 
Liu, H. and Wilson, J.O.S. (2013), “Competition and risk in Japanese banking”, European Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 19 No 1, pp. 1-18.  
Liu, H., Molyneux, P. and Wilson, J.O.S. (2013), “Competition and stability in European Banking: A 
regional Analysis”, Manchester School, Vol. 81 No. 2, pp. 176-201.  
Page 23 of 39 International Journal of Managerial Finance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
International Journal of Managerial Finance
24 
 
 
Liu, H., Molyneux, P. and Nguyen, L.H. (2012), “Competition and risk in South East Asian 
commercial banking”, Applied Economics, Vol. 44 No. 28, pp. 3627-3644. 
Lown, C. and Morgan, D.P. (2006), “The credit cycle and the business cycle: new findings using the 
loan officer opinion survey”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 38 No. 6, pp. 1575-1597. 
Martunez-Miera, D. and Repullo, R. (2010), “Does Competition Reduce the Risk of Bank Failure“, 
Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 23 No. 10, pp. 3638-3664. 
Masood, O. and Sergi, B.S. (2011), “China’s banking system, market structure and competitive 
conditions”, Frontier of Economics in China, Vol. 6 No. 1, pp. 22-35. 
Matthews, K., Murinde, V. and Zhao, T. (2007), “Competitive conditions among the major British 
Banks”, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 31 No. 7, pp. 2025-2042. 
Meeusen, W. and Van de Broeck, J. (1977), “Efficiency estimation from Cobb-Douglas production 
functions with composed error”, International Economic Review, Vol. 18 No. 2, pp. 435-444. 
Mercieca, S., Schaeck, K. and Wolfe, S. (2007), “Small European Banks: benefits from 
diversification”, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 31 No. 7, pp. 1975-1998. 
O’Hara, M. and Shaw, W. (1990), “Deposit insurance and wealth effects: The benefit of being too big 
to fail”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 45 No. 5, pp. 1587-1600. 
Olivero, M. P., Li, Y. and Jeon, B. N. (2011), “Competition in banking and the lending channel: 
Evidence from bank-level data in Asia and Latin America”, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 35 
No. 3, pp. 560-571. 
Park, K.H. (2013), “Testing for competition in the South Korean and Chinese Commercial Banking 
Markets”, Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies, Vol. 42 No. 1, pp. 56-75. 
Prather, L. and Williams, B. (2010), “Bank risk and return: the impact of bank non-interest income”, 
International Journal of Managerial Finance, Vol. 6 No. 3, pp. 220-244. 
Schaeck, K., Cihak, M. (2014), “Competition, efficiency and stability in Banking”, Financial 
Management, Vol. 43 No. 1, pp. 215-241. 
 
Soedarmono, W., Machrouh, F. and Tarazi, A. (2013), “Bank competition, crisis and risk taking: 
Evidence from emerging markets in Asia”, Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions 
and Money, Vol. 23, pp. 196-221. 
Stiroh, K.J. (2004), “Diversification in banking: Is Noninterest Income the Answer”, Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 36 No. 5, pp. 853-882. 
Tabak, B.M., Fazio, D.M. and Cajueiro, D.O. (2012), “The relationship between banking market 
competition and risk-taking: Do size and capitalization matter”, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 
36 No. 12, pp. 3366-3381. 
Tan, Y. and Floros, C. (2013), “Market power, stability and performance in the Chinese banking 
industry”, Economic Issues, Vol. 18 No. 2, pp. 65-89 
Page 24 of 39International Journal of Managerial Finance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
International Journal of Managerial Finance
25 
 
 
Tan, Y. (2014), Performance, Risk and Competition in the Chinese Banking Industry, Chandos 
Publishing, Oxford. 
Yuan, Y. (2006), “The state of competition of the Chinese banking industry”, Journal of Asia 
Economics, Vol. 17 No. 3, pp. 519-534. 
 
 
 
Page 25 of 39 International Journal of Managerial Finance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
International Journal of Managerial Finance
26 
 
 
 
Table 1 Summary of the assets of SOCBs, JSCBs, CCBs and total banking institutions in China over the period 2003-2013 
 
 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
SOCBs 160512 
(58.03%) 
179817 
(56.9%) 
210050 
(56.1%) 
242364 
(55.2%) 
285000 
(53.7%) 
325751 
(51.59%) 
407998 
(51.31%) 
468943 
(49.2%) 
536336 
(47.34%) 
600401 
(52.84%) 
656005 
(43.34%) 
JSCBs 29599 
(10.7%) 
36476 
(11.5%) 
44655 
(11.92%) 
54446 
(12.4%) 
72742 
(13.69%) 
88337 
(13.99%) 
118181 
(14.86%) 
149037 
(15.64%) 
183794 
(16.22%) 
235271 
(20.71%) 
269361 
(17.8%) 
CCBs 14622 
(5.3%) 
17056 
(5.4%) 
20367 
(5.44%) 
25938 
(5.9%) 
33405 
(6.29%) 
41320 
(6.54%) 
56800 
(7.14%) 
78526 
(8.24%) 
99845 
(8.81%) 
123469 
(10.87%) 
151778 
(10.03%) 
Banking 
institutions 
276584 315990 374697 439500 531160 631515 795146 953053 1132873 1136224 1513547 
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Table 2 The definition of variables used to estimate the efficiency-adjusted Lerner index 
Abbreviation Variable  Measurement 
tc Total cost Interest expenses plus non-interest 
expenses 
Y (outputs) Total loans   
 Total deposits  
 Total securities  
 Non-interest income  
π  Bank profitability Net income 
q  Earning assets Total loans and total securities 
W Input prices Input price 1: price of funds- ratio of 
interest expenses over total funding 
 
Input price 2: price of capital- ratio 
of non-interest expenses over fixed 
assets 
mc Marginal cost   
T Time trend variable  
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Table 3 Summary statistics  
 
Variables Observations Mean S.D Min Max 
Total cost 
(interest 
expenses and 
non-interest 
expenses) 
777 3.35 0.97 -0.79 6.86 
Price of 
funds (the 
ratio of 
interest 
expenses to 
total 
deposits) 
777 1.27 0.18 0.74 1.96 
Price of 
capital (the 
ratio of non-
interest 
expenses to 
fixed assets) 
776 1.92 0.26 0.68 2.83 
Total loans 784 4.59 0.99 0.34 7.95 
Securities 782 4.21 1.04 -0.41 7.87 
Non-interest 
income 
767 2.34 1.1 -2.4 5.81 
Total 
deposits 
784 4.85 0.98 0.66 8.26 
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Table 4 Variable definitions and sources 
Variable  Definition Data sources 
Dependent variables 
Credit risk Ratio of impaired loans over 
gross loans 
Bankscope 
Liquidity risk Ratio of total assets over liquid 
assets 
Bankscope 
Capital risk The ratio of 1 over Total 
regulatory capital ratio 
Bankscope 
Insolvency risk  Stability inefficiency Bankscope 
Independent variables 
Efficiency-adjusted Lerner 
index 
See methodology Bankscope 
Bank size Natural logarithm of total assets Bankscope 
Bank diversification The ratio of non-interest income 
over gross revenue 
Bankscope 
Overhead Ratio of overhead expenses 
over total assets 
Bankscope 
Inflation Annual inflation rate World bank (database) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 29 of 39 International Journal of Managerial Finance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
International Journal of Managerial Finance
30 
 
 
Table 5 Summary statistics of the variables  
 Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum  
Credit risk 632 2.78 4.48 0 41.86 
Liquidity risk 777 4.38 1.18 2.5 7.9 
Capital risk 637 0.091 0.05 0.061 0.141 
Insolvency (stability 
inefficiency) 
1100 0.32 0.18 0.19 0.8 
Efficiency-adjusted 
Lerner index 
800 0.53 0.18 0.3 0.62 
Bank size 843 4.9 0.99 0.71 8.51 
Bank diversification 828 13.98 13.31 -12.94 79.4 
Overhead 788 0.01 0.004 0.002 0.04 
Inflation 1227 2.86 1.92 -0.77 5.86 
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Table 6 unit root test for the residuals of the cost function 
Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test for the residuals of the cost function 
 Statistics P-value 
Unadjusted t -3.57  
Adjusted t -2.67 0.004 
 Ho: Panels contain unit root and are not stationary 
 H1: Panels do not contain unit root and are stationary 
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Table 7 Risk-taking behaviour across different bank ownerships 
Variable Dependent variable: 
credit risk 
Dependent variable: 
liquidity risk 
Dependent variable: 
capital risk 
Dependent variable: 
stability inefficiency 
 Coefficient T-stat Coefficient T-stat Coefficient T-stat Coefficient T-stat 
Independent variables 
Lag of dependent 
variable 
0.28*** 5.56 0.26*** 2.69 0.18*** 11.45 -0.25*** -4.49 
Bank competition 
(efficiency-adjusted 
Lerner index) 
5.33* 1.63 -2.88** -2.25 -10.16** -2.08 312.48*** 4.11 
Bank competition 2 -4.48** -2.05 1.32 0.88 -7.25 -0.98 -202.7*** -4.14 
Bank diversification 0.03*** 2.79 -0.02*** -3.88 0.008** 2.25 -0.002** 2.55 
Overhead  16.18*** 6.63 -12.35** -2.29 -5.53*** -2.82 5.27 0.61 
Bank size -0.55*** -5.38 -0.85*** -4.33 -0.2*** -6.55 -0.19*** -2.83 
Inflation -0.03*** -5.99 -0.004 -0.95 -0.077*** -3.65 0.012 0.38 
Joint-stock banks -0.38*** -8.18 -0.59*** -4.38 0.004 0.38 -0.38*** -3.66 
City banks 0.78*** -9.95 -1.28*** -4.95 0.41 0.55 -0.32*** 3.38 
Constant  -0.74 -0.52 4.27 1.12 -5.62* -1.93 -148.8*** -4.06 
No. of observations 417 523 408 624 
Wald test 17088.18*** 955.31*** 128900.28*** 46.4*** 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.315 0.637 0.198 0.524 
AR(1) (p-value) 0.095 0.003 0.007 0.016 
AR(2) (p-value)  0.386 0.148 0.11 0.744 
Notes: all explanatory variables are lagged by a one year period to address the potential endogeneity problem. The Hansen test is the test for over-identifying 
restrictions in the GMM dynamic model estimation. AR(1) and AR(2) refer to the Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 
respectively of order 2 is 0. *, **, *** represent 10, 5, 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 test of autocorrelation for the residuals 
Cumby-Huizinga test for autocorrelation 
H0: Disturbance is MA process up to order q 
H1: serial correlation present at specified lags>q 
Credit risk 
Lag Chi2 p-value 
1 3.87 0.095 
2 0.28 0.386 
 
Liquidity risk 
Lag  Chi2 p-value 
1 8.86 0.003 
2 0.37 0.148 
 
Capital risk 
Lag  Chi2 p-value 
1 7.38 0.007 
2 0.35 0.11 
 
Insolvency risk 
Lag  Chi2 p-value 
1 4.48 0.016 
2 0.15 0.744 
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Table 9 The impact of competition on risk-taking behaviour across different bank ownerships 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: all explanatory variables are lagged by a one year period to address the potential endogeneity problem. The Hansen test is the test for over-identifying 
restrictions in the GMM dynamic model estimation. AR(1) and AR(2) refer to the Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 
respectively of order 2 is 0. *, **, *** represent 10, 5, 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
Variable Dependent variable: 
credit risk 
Dependent variable: 
liquidity risk 
Dependent variable: capital 
risk 
Dependent variable: 
stability inefficiency 
 Coefficient T-stat Coefficient T-stat Coefficient T-stat Coefficient T-stat 
Independent 
variables 
Lag of 
dependent 
variable 
0.22*** 25.95 0.15** 2.44 0.2*** 11.88 -0.38*** -2.91 
Diversification 0.001*** 2.97 -0.015* -1.81 -0.002** -2.00 -0.05** -2.37 
Overhead 32.11*** 8.85 -11.13** 2.48 -4.08* 1.81 10.44 0.96 
Bank size -0.18*** -5.15 -0.51*** 4.44 -0.12*** 5.88 -0.07** -2.48 
Inflation  -0.09*** -11.18 -0.002 -0.35 0.01*** 7.77 0.01* 1.82 
State-owned* 
Lerner 
-0.525*** -2.05 -2.22** 2.19 -0.94*** -2.88 13.6** 2.33 
Joint-stock* 
Lerner 
-0.41*** -6.02 -3.18*** -2.68 -0.92*** -2.65 12.38** 2.29 
City*Lerner -1.23*** -5.58 -3.97*** -3.06 -1.21*** -3.88 12.7** 2.28 
Constant  1.41*** 6.77 -7.34*** -4.26 0.27 0.71 -10.3** -2.23 
No. of 
observations 
417 523 408 624 
Wald test 1338.39*** 212.34*** 1132.65*** 25.3*** 
Hansen test (p-
value) 
0.335 0.489 0.248 0.202 
AR(1) (p-
value) 
0.093 0.003 0.003 0.007 
AR(2) (p-
value)  
0.377 0.215 0.375 0.230 
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Figure 1 Competitive conditions among three different ownerships of Chinese banks: 2003-2013 
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Figure 2 Risk conditions in the Chinese banking industry: 2003-2013 
 
Figure 2a Credit risk in the Chinese banking industry: 2003-2013                                                   Figure 2b Liquidity risk in the Chinese banking industry: 2003-2013 
 
                                           
Figure 2c Capital risk in the Chinese banking industry: 2003-2013                                                  Figure 2d Insolvency risk (stability inefficiency) in the Chinese                                                                      
                                                                                                                                                                                     banking  industry: 2003-2013   
                                                                                                                                                                  
                    
                                                   
                                                                 
Page 36 of 39International Journal of Managerial Finance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
International Journal of Managerial Finance1  
Revision on Paper in IJMF-06-2016-0115.R1 
Dear Editor  
We are grateful to you and the reviewer for your thoughtful reports as well as thorough and 
valuable comments, and are grateful for the opportunity to respond to your comments. In the 
following, we outline the revisions made in response to all comments. By all means the paper 
benefited considerably from all comments received. 
 
1/ Notation and typos: 
1A/ Indicate the ln(..)-function without ambiguity in all equations (despite Tabak’s as there the 
formula are victims of the restricted layout of the Journal). LNNPI in (4) is not readable. 
 
Response: Thank you very much for this comment. Please see equation 2 and equation 4 for 
detail.  
 
1B/ The indices (it) are missing in (3) for W2 on the left hand side, and for LN(W1/W2) on the 
right; the index (t) at T in (2) and (4). 
 
Response: Thank you very much for this comment. This comment has been carefully addressed, 
please see equations 2, 3, and 4 for detail.  
 
1C/ In (4) there should be an exponent of 2 at  (1/2) beta2 ln(W1/W2):   (1/2) beta2 
ln(W1/W2)^2 . 
 
Response: Thank you very much for this comment. This issue has been addressed carefully in the 
revised manuscript. Please see equation 4 for detail.  
 
1D/ Dummy should be written also as “Dummy” in (4). In front of Ln(NPI) there should be a  
coefficient parameter. The notation of Tabak et al. by just writing “…+ Dummies + …” is 
appealing. 
 
Response: Thank you very much for this comment. We have carefully revised the equation 4 to 
address this point.  
 
2/ Cost function (2), marginal cost (3), Z-score function (4), Tab. 6, Tab. 8: 
2A/ p.9, l.33: Augment the different output types with the associated abbreviation Y1, etc. 
p.9, l.47: T should be written with index t in (2). 
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Response: Thank you very much for this comment. This issue has been carefully addressed in the 
manuscript by clearly identifying four different outputs. Please see the first two lines under 
equation 2 for detail. In addition, an index t has been added after T in equation 2.  
 
2B/ Three types of banks are considered, with possibly different intercepts.  But only two 
parameters are given, and none of them is commented. 
Either 3 dummies, or 1 overall intercept and 2 dummies have to be included. If only two are 
reported then some of them are equal?  
p.9, l.43 says that λ0 represents bank-specific heterogeneity. Should it be read as λi?  
As notation in (2) “Dummies” would be a choice, with an explanation in the text.   
 
Response: Thank you very much for this comment. We carefully address this issue by including 
two dummies representing two different ownership types of Chinese commercial banks namely 
joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) and city commercial banks (CCBs). In addition, the 
explanation of Dummies has been provided in the manuscript. Please see the revised paragraph 
under equation 2.  
 
2C/ In Tab. 8, e.g., 2 dummies (for JSCB, CCB) and a Constant are included. Here as reference 
the SOCBs (Constant) are chosen and the estimated coefficients are the difference (relative 
position) to the SOCB-Constant.  
 
Response: Thank you very much for this thoughtful comment. We have added this statement to 
the manuscript. Please see line 14 on page 12 for detail.  
2D/ Estimation of (4), Tab. 6: 
As Tabak et al. have not included their estimated stochastic frontier, a footnote indicating that 
the estimation results can be requested from the authors should be enough. 
[Nevertheless, the bank-type dummies have to be checked. Further, there are 3 outputs but only 
one coefficient delta_j, similarly for delta_jk and theta_j ?] 
 
Response: Thank you very much for this comment. The footnote has been added in the 
manuscript indicating that the estimation results can be requested from the authors. Please see 
footnote 8 on page 11 for detail.  
 
3/ Marginal costs (3): 
The indices (it) are missing at ((C/W2)/Y) and ln(W1/W2)  
 
Response: Thank you very much for this comment. The equation 3 has been carefully revised 
according to this comment. 
 
4/ Z-score function (4):  
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In Tabak et al. p.3370, left col., l.7 from bottom, says that the Z-score is inversely proportional  
to the bank’s probability of default.   
4A/ So I am not sure whether you make it clear enough in the middle of p.10, that the 
explanatory part of the right hand side of (4) describes the maximal Z-score (so the least 
inefficiency/probability of default). A bank is highly inefficient/highly likely to default, if it has a 
very low Z-score, or (“maximal Z-score” – “Z-score of bank i”) is large. A bank type is on 
average highly inefficient, if the mean of υ, µ, for that bank type is large.  
[You use exactly the same error structure as Tabak et al.] 
 
Response: Thank you very much for this comment. This suggested statement has been added in 
the manuscript. Please see the last paragraph on page 10 for detail.  
 
4B/ Could you also state how you calculate the inefficiency. (Cp. (7) in Tabak et al.)  
 
Response: Thank you very much for this comment. Please see the last sentence of the paragraph 
under equation 4 on page 11 for detail.  
 
5/ If it is found to be empirically necessary that dummies for the bank type have to be included to 
distinguish different intercepts, then the maximal Z-score function is that of the bank type with 
the largest intercept.  
5A/ If different bank types are distinguished in (4) by dummies the maximal Z-score is 
determined by the largest intercept. So, average inefficiency of a bank type is calculated by 
adding the difference of the intercepts (largest intercept and intercept of the bank type in 
question) plus µ of the bank type in question.  
Clearly, different dummies in the level and/or different µ’s could be used. 
So the mean of µ is either a constant, or depends only on the bank type, or on i if a bank specific 
efficiency is calculated. But not on i and t.  
 
Response: Thank you very much for this comment. Two ownership type dummies representing 
joint-stock commercial banks and city commercial banks have been included in equation 4.  
 
6/ Last sentence of 4.2 might be misunderstood, so omit. 
p.11, l.35 should read as: In equation (5), … 
p.11 l.47: delta_{i,t-1} should read as alpha_{i,t-1}. 
Tab. 8 last column: -148.83 should read as -148.8***. 
 
Response: Thank you very much for this comment. All these three points have been carefully 
revised in the manuscript.  
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